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The sensory information we
receive from our own bodies is
unique, both from epistemological
and neurological points of view.
Philosophers have noted the
immediate, private quality of
bodily sensation. I can understand
your visual percepts by looking in
the same direction as you, but
understanding your tactile
sensation would require being in
your skin! Descartes took an
additional step, arguing that
because bodily sensation is
immediate, it is also reliable: 
“nor was it without some reason
that I believed that that body
which, by a special right, I call
mine, belonged to me more
properly and closely than any
other; for, in truth, I could never
be separated from it as from other
bodies” (6th Meditation).
The reliability of bodily sensation
implies accurate transmission of
peripheral information to the
higher brain centres of conscious
perception. We shall argue here
that Descartes was wrong, at least
as regards the sense of touch.
Higher cortical regions which
underlie tactile perception also
provide several top–down
influences which modulate
perception: so the brain constructs
our sense of the body, rather than
passively receiving it.
Bodily sensation is also unique in
its neurophysiological basis. The
body has many different classes of
sensory receptor, each transducing
a specific type of stimulus. We
shall focus on information from the
mechanoreceptors in the skin.
Tactile perception may have a
special role in body representation,
because the skin forms the
interface between the body and the
outside world. Other sensory
systems, notably pain and body
position sense, also contribute to
body representation. Nociception
lacks the spatial specificity of
touch, and proprioceptive
contributions to body
representation are difficult to
dissociate from the tactile and
motor events normally correlated
with them. So the brain’s
processing of touch is perhaps the
clearest way to study the
construction of our sense of our
own body.
We shall give three examples of
this construction process. First,
we shall describe visual
enhancement of the sense of
touch. Second, we shall consider
how changes in body posture
modulate tactile inputs. And third,
we shall discuss the problem of
attribution: that is, of how a
perceptual input may be assigned
either to the self or to the body of
another person.
The structure and function of
the peripheral and subcortical
somatosensory system is well
known. Tactile information is
conveyed to the primary
somatosensory cortex (SI) of the
contralateral hemisphere. Here,
tactile perception and body
representation begin to converge.
SI contains a somatotopic map of
the contralateral side of the body
(Figure 1A). Early studies
emphasised its role as a veridical,
organised projection, faithfully
transmitting peripheral inputs. For
example, intracranial stimulation
of sites in the SI map produces
sensation on the corresponding
body part. More recent studies
suggest that SI processes may be
modulated by context, in
particular the general perceptual
experience of the body provided
by other senses such as vision.
Visual–tactile interactions
The spatial organisation of touch
was studied by Weber in 1834,
using two-point discrimination
thresholds (2PDTs). Subjects
report whether they are touched
by one or two tactile stimulators.
The spatial separation of the two
stimulators is varied to find the
threshold distance at which they
can no longer be resolved and are
perceived as a single tap. The
2PDT is a perceptual measure of
tactile acuity and varies
systematically across the body
surface, being lowest where
tactile receptor density is high
(Figure 1B). The SI map of the
body surface may play a key role
in such tasks: tactile
discrimination of different body
parts correlates well with the size
of their representation in SI. And
disruption of SI by transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS)
increases tactile thresholds, while
tactile discrimination training
enlarges the corresponding
representation in SI.
To investigate whether tactile
acuity depends on a raw, sensor-
driven afferent process, or is
modulated by general bodily
representation context, we
compared 2PDT in conditions
where subjects could see their
arm, a magnified view of their arm,
a neutral object appearing at the
location of their arm, or nothing at
all (darkness). Gaze and spatial
attention were always directed
towards the stimulated portion of
the arm. Critically, looking at the
arm provided only a general visual
body representation, but did not
provide any task-relevant
information about the tactile
stimulation itself. Tactile acuity
improved when viewing the arm
relative to both darkness and
viewing a neutral object.
Increasing visual detail with a
magnifying lens improved tactile
acuity further (Figure 2).
A subsequent experiment used
event-related cortical potentials to
measure cortical activity evoked by
double taps in the view-arm and
view-object conditions. There was
no difference between these
conditions 50 ms after the tactile
stimulus — the time of the first
wave of afferent input to the cortex
from the skin. A later component of
the brain’s response, 80 ms post-
stimulus, was significantly
enhanced when vision of the arm
was available, but only when
subjects had to make an explicit
judgement about the tactile inputs
(that is, when touch was task-
relevant). This component has
been identified with a second wave
of cortical processing within SI,
possibly involving a local network
of interneurons. These results
suggest that any bodily
representation context provided by
vision occurs within the primary
cortex itself, rather than by gating
cortical inputs. Visual effects on
light touch do not block or unblock
afferent signals, but change the
efficiency with which they are
processed, perhaps by a cortical
tuning process involving lateral
inhibition.
The flexibility of the local
neuronal network in SI ensures
the brain’s map of the body is not
fixed; each cortical neuron may
have the connections required to
represent touch over a wide
region of the body. Merzenich
and colleagues found that
amputation of a single digit from
a monkey led to rapid changes in
the SI map: within minutes those
neurons that represented the
amputated digit respond to touch
on adjacent parts of the hand.
These wider connections must
have been latent, but inhibited by
a dominant input from the
amputated digit. These results
suggest a metaphor of different
parts of the body surface
competing with each other to
‘own’ cortical representation. By
biasing this competition, the
brain’s representation of the body
can be rapidly and functionally
changed.
Earlier studies of cross-modal
links between vision and touch
focussed either on a common
system for spatial attention, or on
optimal fusion of information
about the same dimension
provided by different senses.
Neither model explains this visual
enhancement of touch
adequately, as spatial attention
was controlled for and visual
information about the tactile
stimulus was not present. Instead,
we suggest vision of a body part
exerts a top–down influence on
primary tactile sensation.
Analogous context effects of
non-informative vision on
proprioception and motor control
have also been reported. The
neural mechanism underlying this
influence could involve
multimodal representations in the
parietal cortex biasing local
networks within SI. These results
suggest that our tactile
perceptions are not raw and
immediate, but are constructed
with reference to a general
abstract body representation.
This hypothesised body
representation recalls the
traditional concept of body
schema. This classical concept,
introduced in 1911 by Head and
Holmes, implies an unconscious
and passively updated
representation of the position of
the body in space, often identified
with the parietal lobes. The body
schema has typically been used
in neuropsychology in a
descriptive, rather than an
explanatory way. Earlier studies in
normal subjects, however,
confirm that both visual and
proprioceptive inputs contribute
to the body schema.
This interaction between vision
and touch may be unsurprising,
given the unique way we perceive
our body. We see our body as a
spatially-extended object like any
other; and we feel our body ‘from
the inside’. The sense of touch,
unusually, embodies both the
exteroceptive and interoceptive
functions within a single sensory
system. As such, interaction
between vision and touch would
seem essential to produce a
single coherent sense of our own
bodily self, as opposed to a series
of fractionated and independent
sensory maps.
The body in space
Tactile stimuli occur within an
anatomical space defined by the
body surface. A largely
somatotopic organisation is found
in SI, and with somewhat less
precision in secondary cortical
areas. But the body itself has a very
complex shape and is in constant
motion. So the relation between
location on the body surface and
external spatial location is both
complex and dynamic. Several
results suggest that tactile
information is referred to external
spatial locations. Even dimensions
of touch which appear to be well
coded in SI are influenced by body
configuration.  Yamamoto and
Kitazawa investigated temporal
order judgement between two
vibrating tactile stimuli mounted on
sticks held in the left and right
hands. When subjects crossed
their arms, the normal
psychophysical curve was
sometimes disrupted. For example,
subjects might have accurately
judged the temporal order when a
buzz occurs on the stick held in the
right hand shortly after one on the
left hand, with the hands in their
normal positions, but judged the
order much less accurately when
the hands or the sticks were
crossed. At some high level of
neural coding, therefore, subjects
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Figure 1.
(A) The sensory homunculus in each hemisphere contains a distorted representation of
the contralateral side of the body. Note enlarged representation of the fingers and face.
(B) Tactile spatial resolution varies dramatically between different body parts. Spatial
resolution correlates well with the size of the corresponding representation in
somatosensory cortex. Here, spatial resolution is measured as the two point discrimi-
nation threshold: the smallest distance between two simultaneous point contacts which
are felt as two touches rather than one. (Adapted from: (A) Penfield, W. and Rasmussen,
T. (1950). The cerebral cortex of man. A clinical study of localization of function.
(Macmillan, New York); and (B) Weinstein, S. (1968). Intensive and extensive aspects of
tactile sensitivity as a function of body part, sex and laterality. In The Skin Senses, D.R.
Kenshalo, ed. (Thomas, Springfield, Illinois), pp. 195–218.)
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must represent the stimuli, not by
location on the body surface, but
by their external spatial location.
More compellingly, when both the
hands and the sticks were crossed
so the buzzers occupied their
standard uncrossed location,
former levels of accuracy were
reattained. Clearly, the vibratory
percept represented in SI must be
modulated by neural
representations of external space.
Previous studies using crossed
hands had shown the importance
of external spatial location in
selective attention to signals, but it
is surprising that the primary
elements of tactile perception, so
firmly anchored in the body space
organisation of skin receptors,
show the same influences. One
possible criticism of crossed hands
experiments may be that they
capitalise on a particularly drastic
and unusual spatial manipulation.
We have also studied the effects
of crossing the fingers on tactile
perception. Subjects judged
whether a metal bar applied to the
pad of the right index or middle
fingers at random did or did not
contain a small gap. The tests were
performed in a normal finger
posture, and in a crossed posture
in counterbalanced order. Subjects
were touched on a single finger on
each trial, and posture was
irrelevant to the task. Tactile
thresholds were worse in the
crossed posture than in normal
posture. Even basic tactile acuity is
also modulated by external spatial
location. Poor tactile acuity with
fingers crossed may reflect a
mismatch between the stimulus
location in body space and its
unusual location in external space.
Postural modulations of tactile
perception are not restricted to the
special posture and large spatial
displacements of crossed hands,
nor to tasks involving
discrimination between the
crossed body parts. These spatial
effects on primary dimensions of
tactile processing again suggest
strong modulation of tactile
perception by higher aspects of
body representation.
Several studies suggest that
primary sensory input from the
body also strongly influences
more abstract processing of body
representations. For example,
when subjects are asked to
discriminate between another
person’s imagined hands, their
reaction time is influenced by the
posture of their own unseen
hands. General spatial body
representations are strongly
influenced by afferent
proprioceptive signals from the
subject’s own body. The abstract
body schema may have evolved
from somatosensory association
cortex to generalise to the bodies
of others.
Attribution
Finally, an important interaction
between tactile perception and
body representation occurs at the
highest psychological level of
processing: the conscious sense
of self. Baumeister recently wrote
“All over the world, self begins
with body”. The development of
the sense of self is based on
sensory signals which discriminate
internal from external events.
These signals may either be
efferent (‘I’ am whatever my motor
commands can cause to move) or
afferent (‘I’ am the receiver of
peripheral information). Separating
the contributions of these two
signals has proved difficult
experimentally, and obscures the
interesting issue of how they are
combined: we experience a single
coherent self, rather than separate
efferent and afferent selves.
Tactile information plays a unique
role in this process, because it can
describe both external objects and
the body itself. Tactile perception
plays a major role in defining the
boundary between the self and the
external world.
This process has been
investigated in attribution
experiments. A typical
experimental method uses
combined tactile and visual
information to ‘persuade’ subjects
that an external object is in fact
part of their own body. Subjects
might view a fake hand being
stroked while they experience a
similar stroking movement applied
to their own unseen hand. The
correlated visual and tactile input
causes subjects to attribute the
fake hand to themselves. These
illusions can be extremely
powerful. For example, a blow to
the fake body part after attribution
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Figure 2. Non-informative vision enhances tactile spatial resolution.
Two-point discrimination thresholds (2PDT) measured on the forearm under different
visual conditions. Viewing the arm gives better tactile resolution than either perfor-
mance in darkness or viewing a neutral object projected via mirrors to appear in the
same location as the arm. Magnifying the view of the arm further improves tactile res-
olution. The moment of tactile stimulation is never seen, preventing trivial vision of the
stimulators. (Adapted from Kennett et al., (2001).)
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will elicit a physiological response
in the observer. In this case, a
purely visual input from an
external object elicits a response
appropriate to a tactile input to
one’s own body. This finding
seems opposed to the traditional
philosophical view of tactile
sensations as private.
Associations between visual and
tactile inputs can clearly be very
strong and contribute to our sense
of bodily self. Interestingly,
attribution has some important
properties in common with both
visual enhancement and postural
modulation of touch, suggesting a
common neural mechanism.
Attribution may depend on the
rubber hand having an appropriate
postural configuration. Pavani and
colleagues found that a light on a
rubber hand maximally interfered
with a simultaneous tactile input
when the rubber hands were seen
to have the same postural
configuration as the subject’s own
hands.
The dual nature of the body as
both an external and internal
object was mentioned above.
Neural integration of vision and
touch may be essential for
developing and maintaining this
sense of bodily self. Some neural
mechanism must therefore bind
internal and external
representations. Single neurons in
monkey parietal cortex responded
when the monkey viewed a stuffed
arm being stroked, while
experiencing synchronous stroking
on its own arm. When the timing of
the viewed and felt stroking was
made asynchronous, these
neurons were less active. This
suggests a special role of parietal
cortex in integrating visual and
tactile inputs to create a coherent
representation of the bodily self.
Involvement of parietal cortex in
body representation has been
confirmed by neuropsychological
studies of patients with focal
lesions. A crucial distinction can
be made here between right and
left hemisphere lesions. Patients
with right hemisphere lesions may
disown a plegic left limb or
attribute it to another person. We
speculate that the affected limb is
disattributed from the bodily self,
because the normal correlation
between visual and tactile input is
lacking as a result of the sensory
loss. Impaired spatial attentional
mechanisms in the right parietal
cortex may also fail to resolve the
lack of visual–tactile correlation. In
contrast, left parietal lesions may
produce a specific difficulty in
localising body parts. When asked
to point to the elbow, for example,
patients will typically point to
another body part, such as the
shoulder or forearm. The parietal
lobe of the left hemisphere may
contain an abstract body
representation used for purposes
of localisation. The left
hemisphere maintains an abstract
representation of the spatial
organisation of body parts, while
the right hemisphere may
correlate multisensory stimuli to
maintain a sense of bodily self.
The condition of
heterotopagnosia, after left
parietal damage, seems to involve
a higher processing stage, in
which body parts are assigned to
persons. When asked to point to
their own elbow, these patients
repeatedly point to the examiner’s
elbow. The localisation within the
body map is correct, but the body
representation is transposed to
another person. This puzzling
condition could arise if a left
parietal abstract body
representation fails to integrate
attribution information from
visual–tactile correlation
processes. In normal function, a
generalised body representation
is activated for processes
involving the spatial organisation
of body parts in one’s own body,
and also when viewing the bodies
of others. The ownership of the
body concerned — the answer to
the question: is that part of ‘me’?
— would be computed by a
process of correlating visual and
proprioceptive inputs. The left
parietal cortex would use this
information to assign the body
part to a particular person. This
process of binding spatial body
part information to attribution
information may be impaired in
heterotopagnosia.
Conclusion
The human sense of touch relies
on a specialised neural system for
transmission of afferent input.
Afferent inputs to primary
somatosensory cortex result in
tactile perceptions, characterised
by their phenomenological
vividness. Epistemologists have
found these perceptions intriguing
because they appear to be
private: another person cannot
know what I am feeling, because
only ‘I’ am connected to my tactile
receptors. However,
epistemologists have confused
the correct close connection of
touch with the bodily self, with the
incorrect idea of tactile perception
as a raw sense datum.
Neuroscience can clarify how
tactile perception contributes to a
conscious sense of the bodily self,
by describing the neural
mechanisms underlying the
mutual and interactive relation
between primary tactile
perception and higher cortical
representations of the body. Even
highly abstract cognitive
representations, such as ‘self’,
may be understood in terms of
their sensorimotor bases.
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